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Operate in the NAS 
 
Tara Halt 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, USA, haltt@my.erau.edu 
 
As the number of activities in space and near-space increase, both government and industry will need to consider 
the best practice to maintain safe operations for their activities. The National Airspace in the United States is already 
extremely complicated with over 5,000 flights taking off and landing daily. Standards and eventually some type of 
certification will need to be developed for the launch vehicles in the commercial space industry. The implementation 
of standards and certification will help to ensure that the spacecraft will not be a danger to the other vehicles 
operating in the NAS. These standards would most likely be derived from a safety organization. By exploring the 
standards and rules that have been developed by organizations in other industries, the commercial space industry can 
efficiently and effectively create standards that will not compromise safety or hinder the growth of the industry.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Spaceflight has changed greatly since its inception in 
the 1950s. Space was once the sole domain of the 
United State and the Soviet Union, who were engaged 
in an intense international competition for “space 
supremacy” and national pride. Today, spaceflight has 
evolved to encompass both other entities and a myriad 
of other objectives. Instead of just two countries using 
orbital and suborbital space (hereinafter “orbital 
resources”), the entities vying for orbital resources 
include more than a dozen countries and hundreds of 
private corporations. This just includes parties with a 
direct access to space; there are thousands of other 
companies and organizations that interact indirectly 
with space in a multitude of support roles.  Additionally, 
these other entities have extremely diverse objectives 
including recreational manned flights; manned planet 
and moon colonization; space station re-supply (both 
manned and unmanned); planet, moon, and asteroid 
mining; and satellite launching and repair, just to name 
a few examples.  As this evolution continues, it is 
expected that the number of entities involved and the 
diversity of goals will only increase. Additionally, 
coordination between international governmental and 
private enterprises is rudimentary at best.  
This evolution has set the stage for a fairly chaotic 
and arguably unsafe environment for commercial space 
operations.  This is evidenced by recent commercial and 
governmental space launch failures, which included loss 
of life. What is needed is a framework for international 
governmental agencies and corporations to continue to 
develop and implement their objectives, while providing 
the public with assurances of safety.  Preferably, this 
system would include a system of incentives for safe 
development of space resources. For example, one of 
the incentives could be priority over other entities when 
operating in the National Airspace.  
 Space is filled with cutting edge, high-risk 
technologies and scenarios. Due to its cutting edge 
nature, spaceflight activities come with risks that may 
include the possibility of a catastrophic failure.  
However, spaceflight is only the most recent form of 
transportation that has been developed.  Other sectors of 
transportation including railroad, automobile, 
aeronautical and maritime preceded the space industry. 
There have been accidents in every type of 
transportation and, as a result, each of the various 
industries have always attempted to remedy their 
mistakes by creating new organizations or committees 
to regulate safety. Accordingly, the space sector can 
learn a great deal from both its own mistakes and the 
mistakes of other transportation sectors. The 
aeronautical and maritime industries are particularly 
useful guides because in both cases, people lives are 
often placed in great danger if there is a catastrophic 
failure en route to a destination.  
Due to the continually evolving nature of the 
worldwide commercial spaceflight industry, and the 
diversity of the entities involved, space traffic 
management is expected to present extreme challenges.  
However, as with the development of the commercial 
aviation industry, safety should be paramount in any 
spaceflight traffic management scheme. It is proposed 
herein to study and take advantage of the strides in 
safety that other industries have achieved. The space 
industry will use this knowledge to develop a 
framework of safety regulations and processes that 
incentivize the developing commercial space 
transportation industry to implement safety best 
practices, in order to receive priority in the space traffic 
management schemes that are ultimately developed. 
Accordingly, companies or countries that implement 
best practices in safety will benefit from receiving 
prioritized status in a spaceflight traffic management 
scheme. 
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This paper will provide an overview of the 
successful implementation of safety regimens of other 
transportation sectors, and how they can be utilized as 
an international framework for incentivizing safety in 
the commercial spaceflight industry by providing higher 
priority in a space transportation management scheme.  
 
 
II. GOVERNMENTAL, PRIVATE INDUSTRY OR 
THIRD-PARTY FRAMEWORK 
 
Governmental bodies (both national and 
international) are often accurately accused of being 
bureaucratic and slow to react. For example, in the 
United States, new regulations often take four to six 
years or longer until they officially become a part of the 
federal registry. A slow, nonresponsive and reactionary 
framework will not benefit the commercial space 
transportation industry. 
Leaving oversight to private industry, however, 
presents its own challenges. Many companies put forth 
the argument that they are clearly incentivized to ensure 
that their systems will be safe because they would not 
want to kill their own customers. While this is a valid 
point when viewed on a macro-scale, a look at history 
proves otherwise.  During the development of 
components, systems or processes, companies are 
making what are perceived as small, non-consequential 
decisions; they tend to make compromise safety if the 
cost savings are significant. This is a pattern in many 
industries that are related or unrelated to transportation.  
For example, for offshore drilling platforms, large and 
small companies in the oil and gas industry been known 
to make shortcuts in certain safety areas in order to 
increase their profit margins. Accordingly, relying upon 
industry to “do the right thing” will likely not result in a 
migration toward safer practices.  
An independent safety organization could be an 
ideal compromise between the bureaucratic and 
complicated government and the ambitious and 
sometimes short-sighted nature of the commercial space 
industry. Collaboration between the government, 
companies, and an independent safety organization 
would decrease the chance that a potential risk would go 
unnoticed.  
 
III. BEST PRACTICES OF OTHER INDUSTRIES 
A. ACCIDENT THEORIES 
Safety experts have two schools of thought in 
regards to safety: 1) Normal Accident Theory and 2) 
High Reliability Theory. These theories can be essential 
when trying to decide what the scope and focus of an 
independent or dependent regulatory agency should be.  
Normal Accident Theory is a concept that originates in 
Charles Perrow’s book, “Normal Accidents: Living with 
High-Risk Technologies”. Normal Accident Theory 
emphasizes that technological and organizational 
complexities contribute to failures (Greenfield). 
Accidents are often inevitable in highly complex 
systems. This is why normal accidents can also be 
referred to as “inevitable accidents (Perrow).” Normal 
Accident Theory focuses on systems approaches and 
system thinking. Incidents or “close calls” can often 
give a company or organization insight into how all the 
systems are inter-related (Greenfield). In order to 
prevent normal accidents, companies need to understand 
all the details and complexities of their program and 
systems (Perrow). They must also analyse close calls 
and mishaps to determine root causes. The company 
should then use all this knowledge to improve future 
programs and operations.  
High Reliability Theory was developed by a group 
of researchers at the University of California, Berkeley. 
This team was tasked with examining aircraft carriers, 
the FAA’s air traffic control system and nuclear power 
operations (Greenfield). High Reliability Theory 
believes that if a high-risk technology is properly 
designed and managed, then the system should be 
robust enough to account for human errors and avoid 
situations that would lead to catastrophic failures 
(Columbia). This theory looks at a program or a system 
from the bottom up. The premise is that if each 
individual component is sufficiently reviewed and 
determined to be highly reliable, then the overall system 
will be highly reliable and safe. There two theories were 
used to help support the conclusions that the Columbia 
Accident Investigation made after the tragic Space 
Shuttle accident in 2003 (Columbia).  
If an organization were to focus on normal accident 
theory, then that organization would require a highly 
technical team that would be able to understand all the 
complexities of a spacecraft and its system. While the 
organization would believe that accidents are inevitable, 
the culture would be focused on learning from close 
calls and mishaps to minimize the probability that an 
event would occur or the damage that it could create. 
Normal accident theory is often describes as a “top 
down approach (Perrow).” On the other hand, the 
independent organization could also decide to accept the 
high reliability theory which would involve a lot of 
testing and research in order to determine if a system is 
safe and reliable. Since high reliability theory focuses 
on each component, it is often referred to as a “bottom 
up approach (Columbia).” An organization that 
implements both approaches, both top-down and 
bottom-up reviews of their systems and processes, 
would receive extra points toward a point-based 
prioritized status in a space traffic management scheme. 
The number of points that a company has would 
determine their level of prioritization in this model. A 
higher level would give a company a higher priority 
status in a space traffic management scheme.  
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B. NAVAL REACTOR SAFETY PROGRAMS 
The Navy Submarine Force was mentioned in the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Report as a good 
example of an adaptive and effective safety program. 
The Naval Reactor Program has been particularly 
successful with 5,500 reactor years of experience 
without an accident (Columbia). SUBSAFE, the navy’s 
non-nuclear safety program, is also an excellent model 
which can help guide other industries and organization 
through the development of their own safety programs. 
NASA, following a recommendation from the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, has established a 
dialogue with the Navy to learn more about their 
programs and what elements make its safety program so 
successful (Columbia).  A successful program is based 
on key principles such as: 
• Communication and Action 
• Recurring Training and Learning from mistakes 
• Encouraging Minority Opinions 
• Retaining Knowledge 
• Worst-Case Event Failures (Columbia) 
 
For proper communication and action, an 
organization should maintain a program with clear 
checks and balances. All of the involved parties within 
the organization should know their responsibilities, and 
how they fit within the overall organization.  
The second element that is highly valued in the 
Navy Submarine Force is training and learning from 
mistakes. All personnel involved in the Navy Reactor 
program have received stringent training and have been 
thoroughly educated on accidents in other sectors 
outside the marine world such as NASA’s Challenger 
accident. A view of these outside incidents would 
provide a good basis for understanding the nature and 
cause of accidents, and how to avoid them.  In essence, 
the companies would be learning from the mistakes of 
others.   
Commercial space companies should also try to 
encourage minority opinions like the Navy to make sure 
that safety issues are not ignored simply because it is an 
unpopular opinion. Some employees may feel that they 
should keep their concerns to themselves. It is important 
to express these concerns because it may save people’s 
lives in the future. There should be a way that people 
can express their doubts and concerns without the fear 
that it will impact their employment status. Minority 
opinions are important because it helps to ensure that all 
potential problems have been identified.  
The ability to retain knowledge would help a 
company focus on its guiding principles and keep track 
of its overall goals when facing obstacles and making 
important decisions. Employees should have at least a 
basic understanding of all systems on a satellite or 
spacecraft even if it is not their area of expertise.  
While it can be unpleasant or demotivating to think 
about, all companies should prepare for the worst-case 
scenario and be fully aware of all the consequences that 
could stem from a catastrophic failure. These principles 
should be the focus of any independent oversight 
organization that is charged with keeping spaceflight 
safe.  
 
IV. UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED 
AGENCIES 
 
The United Nations has a plurality of related 
organizations that can act as a guide for the 
implementation of any future space organization.  
The International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) is a specialized UN Agency that develops 
international Standards and Recommended Practices 
(SARPs) that countries can reference when creating 
their own laws in the aviation industry. Their overall 
vision is to “achieve the sustainable growth of the 
global civil aviation system (About ICAO).” Almost all 
countries are member states of ICAO. With over 
100,000 flights operating daily in the air transport 
network, it is essential that there is overall acceptance of 
the SARPs that are created by ICAO (About ICAO).  
The International Maritime Organization is 
very similar model to ICAO, but for the maritime 
industry. The IMO is the “global standard-setting 
authority for the safety, security and environmental 
performance of international shipping. Its main role is to 
create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry 
that is fair and effective, universally adopted and 
universally implemented (About IMO).” The 
International Maritime Organization work is focused on 
the environment, collaboration between countries, legal 
issues, security, and safety.  
There has been some discussion among experts 
about creating an organization similar to ICAO and 
IMO for the space industry, but so far there has been no 
significant progress in that area (Taking a page). The 
United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs 
(UNOOSA) is the best example of international 
leadership that the space industry currently has. 
UNOOSA works to “promote international cooperation 
in the peaceful use and exploration of space, and in the 
utilization of space science and technology for 
sustainable economic and social development (About 
UNOOSA).” UNOOSA has helped to develop five 
treaties and five sets of principles that are supposed to 
guide the activities of outer space. It remains unclear if 
UNOOSA would be capable of any disciplinary action 
if those treaties were to be broken. One of the primary 
issues with the treaties that UNOOSA created is that 
some of them have not been ratified by the primary 
space faring nations, for example, Russia, China, and 
the United States (About UNOOSA).  
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UNOOSA and ICAO have tried to start 
preparing for the future by creating a portal on both 
websites where interested parties can upload documents 
and start a dialogue (About ICAO). Points of contact are 
also included on the portal as an attempt to facilitate 
collaboration from all interested parties. Some of the 
more prominent organizations that have been included 
are NASA, Canadian Space Agency, DLR, FAA, and 
the International Association for the Advancement of 
Space Safety (IAASS). The main challenge for 
UNOOSA and ICAO in regards to space is the all the 
uncertainty. It is difficult to determine at this time the 
type of guidance that the space sector will need from an 
international organization. While it is important to have 
dialogue at an international level, the United States 
should establish its own oversight models first since 
many countries look to the United States as the prime 
example when developing their own organizations and 
regulations.  
 
V. CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES 
Besides IMO, the marine sector also relies on the 
expertise found in its classification societies. In fact, the 
International Association of Classification Societies 
(ICAS) provides the technical support for the 
International Maritime Organization (About IMO). The 
fact that the IMO uses ICAS as its technical support 
shows how well respected classification societies are in 
the marine sector. ICAS consist of 12 maritime 
classification societies. These societies are “impartial 
organizations consisting of technical experts that have 
established a system of public safety based on private 
law contracts. They are often described as the unofficial 
‘policemen’ in the marine world (Classification).”  
Merchants and ship owners developed classification 
Societies in the 1800s (Llyod’s). The captains and 
owners would share the risks and rewards of a voyage 
by a process that is referred to today as underwriting 
(Classification). The involved parties needed a way to 
assess the quality of the ship before they would feel 
confident moving forward with the underwriting 
process. This is where the concept of classification 
societies began and has been a vital part of the maritime 
industry ever since.  
A classification society sets standards for the design, 
construction, and maintenance of maritime vessels.  
According to the ICAS website, the rules and standards 
set by the 12 members of ICAS encompass “More than 
90% of the world's cargo carrying tonnage (Llyods’s).” 
Certification is often done by these societies for a fee. 
For ship owners, it is worth the time and money to get 
certified because often insurers will not insure the ships 
without certification from those societies. In the marine 
sector, classification societies have reached a high level 
of credibility and prominence. An important aspect of 
classification societies is that they are independent, self-
regulating, and externally audited (Classification). 
These societies have no commercial interests in the 
areas of ship design, manufacturing etc.…  Therefore, It 
would be very unlikely that a classification society 
would place more value on profit rather than safe 
practices. 
Commercial Space could most likely adopt a similar 
system with the same success. In commercial space, a 
classification society could do similar activities and 
services that it does for the marine sector such as 
developing standards and certifying vehicles. With an 
established certification and standards process, 
companies would know what is required even before 
they begin the design phase. This would reduce the need 
to issue waivers that could potentially compromise the 
overall safety of the system. With an independent body 
giving its stamp of approval, a commercial company 
could apply for a license from the FAA with more 
confidence.  A certification from an independent body 
could be thought in the same light as a more in depth 
safety approval, a process that is currently done by the 
FAA for safety elements such as training or an 
identified safety component. 
 
VI. AEROSPACE CORPORATION 
While an international organization may be 
necessary in the future, the US would also benefit from 
having an independent safety organization domestically. 
Launches are always risky but that risk of failure can be 
decreased when an independent organization is 
involved.  One the best and most relevant examples of 
an independent safety organization is the relationship 
between The Aerospace Corporation and the Air Force. 
The Aerospace Corporation is a non-profit organization 
and a Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center (FFRDC). The Department of Defense identified 
the main areas that The Aerospace Corporation focuses 
on since it is a FFRDC.  These elements are launch 
certification, system-of-systems engineering, systems 
development and acquisition, process implementation, 
and technology application (Columbia). The Aerospace 
Corporation independent launch verification process has 
proven to be quite effective. The Air Force “only has a 
2.9 percent probability of failure rate in comparison to 
the commercial sector which is 14.6 percent 
(Columbia).” Before a launch, The Aerospace 
Corporation sends a letter to the Air Force that states 
that the vehicle has been independently verified as ready 
for launch. The staff of the Aerospace Corporation has a 
very thorough review process that goes through every 
aspect of launch from payload integration to the 
adequacy of flight and ground hardware (Columbia). As 
a result, the Air Force can launch their payloads with 
increased confidence. More than two thirds of the 
people that are employed at The Aerospace Corporation 
have highly technical backgrounds (Sgobba). These 
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people are the experts in their respective fields, which 
make them great assets when they are hired as 
consultants to other commercial space companies. The 
Aerospace Corporation employees are able to 
understand the complexities a space vehicle’s 
components and consequences of system failures. The 
Aerospace Corporation embodies that idea that a safety 
certification should be even more knowledge and 
experienced than the design team of a launch vehicle 
(Sgobba). 
 
 
VII.RELEVANCE TO SPACE TRAFFIC 
MANAGEMENT  
 
Analysing the safety requirements of other 
organizations is an important step when trying to 
determine how space traffic will be integrated into the 
National Airspace system. When spacecraft are 
operating, it is acknowledged that they will be flying 
over other countries; possibly even in that country’s 
airspace. This paper focuses on the National Airspace 
System in the United States for the purposes of 
simplicity. A spacecraft should not endanger other 
aircraft especially since aircraft are more vulnerable to 
debris than buildings on the ground. A breakup of a 
spacecraft can cover a very large area. In October 2014, 
Virgin Galactic and Scaled Composites’ SpaceShipTwo 
broke up during its 4th powered test flight. The debris 
from the incident was mainly spread over a 5-mile area 
but there were some pieces found as far as 35 miles 
(SpaceShipTwo). No company can say with absolute 
certainty where debris would land in the event of a 
catastrophic failure. Inflight breakdown is an important 
consideration for suborbital flights since many designs 
that are in development consists of a vehicle that will be 
flown like an airplane or a glider during take-off or 
landing. Suborbital vehicles will spend a lot more time 
in the National Airspace System than a traditional 
orbital launch vehicle that only operates for brief 
periods of time. Airlines will not be very cooperative if 
they have to always reroute their flights to 
accommodate space traffic.  During the Space Shuttle 
days, airlines usually were very cooperative when 
NASA wanted to launch but this pattern of 
accommodation is not expected to continue for 
commercial space companies. With both air and space 
companies looking to make a profit, no one wants to 
have to delay their flight or launch because of another 
company.  
Airline regulations are often referred to as 
“blood laws.” The basis of many regulations comes 
from a fatal accident. The fatal inflight collision 
between TWA Flight 2 and United Airlines Flight 718 
near the Grand Canyon motivated the government to 
upgrade the air traffic control system and create the 
Federal Aviation Agency (Administration) to oversee 
aviation safety in the United States (FAA History). 
After the fatal fire aboard Air Canada 797 killed 23 
people, the Federal Aviation Administration made new 
regulations in response (FAA History). Since the fire 
started in lavatory, the first regulation required that all 
airplane lavatories are equipped with smoke detectors. 
The FAA also implemented regulations that required 
that seats be fitted with a flame resistant layer and 
adequate floor lighting should be provided for 
passengers (FAA History). It seems a bit morbid to 
continue this practice where regulations are only 
developed after human lives are lost. Currently the FAA 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) has 
moratorium on creating regulations for crew and 
spaceflight participants. The moratorium is expected to 
be extended by the Senate until at least 2020. The 
House of Representatives has discussed extending it 
even further until 2025 (Messier).  
If the government is unable to create 
regulations, for occupants, standards for space vehicles 
should be developed by an independent body. The FAA 
AST office focuses on licensing activities but they do 
not license vehicles. In fact, the NTSB investigation of 
the SpaceShipTwo crash revealed that most companies 
do not even approach the government until after their 
vehicle is already developed (SpaceShipTwo). This 
being the case, there should be an independent body 
such as a classification society that can certify that the 
vehicle will not cause a disruption to the complicated 
national airspace system.  Currently, commercial 
aircraft require an extensive certification and inspection. 
While the commercial space industry may not be ready 
for a similar stringent process, there needs to be more 
guidance to manufacturers than what is currently 
offered. Standards could help companies design their 
vehicles so that they can receive license from the FAA 
more quickly and avoid the potential high costs of 
having to redesign a vehicle close to a planned launch 
date. Customers who want to launch payloads will want 
the vehicles they are riding on to be dependent and have 
a reasonable chance of mission success. Thus far, no 
paying customers have been flown on a commercial 
launch vehicle. It seems unreasonable to allow these 
unproven vehicles to operate in the National Airspace 
without some type of standards from a trusted safety 
organization.  
Standards and other recommended practices 
could be used as the basis for a prioritization model. In 
the model, companies that comply with the standards 
would be given priority over those who do not. For 
example, if two companies are vying for the same 
launch date, priority would be given to the company that 
follows the standards set by the independent safety 
organization. The safer the vehicle is, the higher the 
priority they will receive. There could be various levels 
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within this scheme. A company’s prioritization level 
would be determined by the number of points a 
company has. For example, a company would receive 
more points if they analysed their systems with the both 
top down and bottom approaches that were mentioned 
earlier in this paper.   There are some issues that would 
need to be resolved in order for this model to be both 
effective and efficient. The main issue is how to 
compare suborbital and orbital vehicles since there are 
many differences between spacecraft that operate in 
space or near space.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
An independent oversight organization that was a 
combination of the classification society model and The 
Aerospace Corporation model could help the 
commercial space industry grow and maintain a high 
level of safe operations. Oversight of the commercial 
space industry should not be prescriptive. It is much 
more beneficial to all involved parties to focus on safety 
cases rather than explicit design requirements. It is 
important to note that even with these independent 
agencies having some oversight it would still be 
necessary to have spaceport and launches licensed by 
the FAA. For example, at a launch The Aerospace 
Corporation could verify that a vehicle is ready for 
launch, while an FAA Inspector could ensure that the 
safety of the uninvolved public. This would create an 
effective system of checks and balances that minimize 
the chance that a safety issue was overlooked.  
 The prioritization model presented in this paper 
would be an excellent incentive for the industry. Those 
who do not meet the standards would be less likely to 
receive their desired launch date if there are conflicts 
with other companies.  It will be challenging to integrate 
spacecraft with the National Airspace System but the 
technology innovations that will be developed as a 
result could make the National Airspace System even 
more efficient than it is currently.  
 
 
VIIII. References 
1. Greenfield, M. (n.d.). Normal Accident Theory: 
The changing Face of NASA and Aerospace. 
Retrieved August 10, 2015. 
2. Perrow, C. (n.d.). Normal Accidents. Retrieved 
August 17, 2015. 
3. Columbia Accident Investigation Board. (n.d.). 
Chapter 7: The Accident’s Organizational Causes. 
Retrieved August 14, 2015. 
4. About ICAO. (n.d.). Retrieved August 8, 2015 
5. About IMO. (n.d.). Retrieved August 11, 2015. 
6. About UNOOSA. (n.d.). Retrieved August 20, 
2015. 
7. Lloyd's Register: Who We Are. (n.d.). Retrieved 
August 11, 2015. 
8. CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES - WHAT, WHY 
and HOW? (n.d.). Retrieved August 17, 2015. 
9. Taking a page from maritime practice to self-
regulate the commercial space industry. (n.d.). 
Retrieved August 8, 2015.  
10. Sgobba, T. (n.d.). IAASS Commercial Spaceflight 
Safety. Retrieved August 14, 2015. 
11. SpaceShipTwo Rocket Plane Debris Spread Over 
35 Miles, NTSB Says - NBC News. (2015, 
November 4). Retrieved August 12, 2015. 
12. FAA History. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2015. 
13. Messier, D. (n.d.). House Measure Would Extend 
Commercial Spaceflight Learning Period by 8 
Years. Retrieved August 16, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
